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OVERDETERMINED CAUSATION CASES, CONTRIBUTION 
AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE
SAMUEL FEREY? AND PIERRE DEHEZ??
I. INTRODUCTION
Causation is one of the most intricate and complex issues in the law. 
As Richard Wright stated, “in all of tort law, there is no concept which has 
been as pervasive and yet elusive as the causation requirement.”1 Among 
the issues raised by causation requirements, overdetermination is, at least 
conceptually, particularly difficult to deal with. The reason is that applying 
standard criteria of causation—based on necessity requirements (e.g., but-
for-test, sine qua non conditions)—to overdetermined-causation cases fails 
to give coherent and comprehensive answers to courts. The most famous 
example is the following: two fires, lighted separately by tortfeasors X and 
Y, merge together. The merged fire then destroys the plaintiff’s house. 
“Here, application of the ‘but-for’ test would exonerate both X and Y if 
each fire were large enough to burn the house by itself. X’s fire was not 
causal. Even in the absence of X’s fire, the house would have been burned 
by Y’s fire.”2 So, X’s fire is not a but-for cause nor is Y’s fire. And the 
same thing could be said about Y’s fire. Y’s fire is not causal. The applica-
? BETA (University of Lorraine, Nancy, France), samuel.ferey@univ-lorraine.fr.
?? CORE (University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), pierre.dehez@uclouvain.be. We are 
grateful for helpful comments from the Editor and referees. Authors acknowledge the financial support 
from the French National Agency for Research (JCJC Damage program, ANR-12-JSH1-0001, 2012-
2016). 
1. Richard Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985). Prosser states: 
“There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon 
which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor, despite the manifold attempts which have 
been made to clarify the subject, is there yet any general agreement as to the proper approach.” William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
109, 109 (1983); see also, e.g., RICHARD GOLDBERG, PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION vii (2011); 
HERBERT L.A. HART & TONY A. M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW xxxiii (2d ed. 1985); JOHN L.
MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY ON CAUSATION 1 (L. Jonathan Cohen ed., 1974); 
MICHAEL MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 
3 (2009); Tony A. M. Honoré, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 363–85 (D. G. Owen ed., 1995); Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-
Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 968 (2001) (upholding the 
“dignity of the law” requires modifying the but-for standard); Richard Wright, Once More into the 
Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1071, 1072 (2001). 
2. David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 94 KY. L. J. 277, 280 (2005). 
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638 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:2
tion of the but-for test in these circumstances leads to dilemmas and para-
doxes; holding that none of the two wrongdoers be liable violates common 
sense and the principles of distributive and corrective justice.3
This failure explains why legal thought and jurisprudence has tried to 
elaborate further on causation requirements. For example, in the United 
States, chapter five of the Third Restatement of Torts is dedicated to this 
issue.4 The Third Restatement advocates new methods to deal with overde-
termined causation cases and uses interesting concepts, such as multiple 
sufficient causes, multiple sufficient causal sets, preemption, and trivial 
contribution.5 In Europe, the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) 
deals with this issue.6 From a larger perspective, legal scholars in the Unit-
ed States and elsewhere have also written extensively on this topic to reach 
better and more convincing solutions. For example, following Herbert L.A. 
Hart, Tony A.M. Honoré, and John Mackie, Richard Wright has elaborated 
the NESS criterion to solve some of these paradoxes.7 Others, like Jane 
Stapleton, think that the law has to go further and “should adopt a notion of 
a ‘cause’ that is wider than the relation of necessity that is encapsulated in 
the but-for test.”8 These scholars recognize the relevance of causal contri-
bution, i.e. a factor may have had a causal role due to a positive, even un-
necessary, contribution “to the relevant mechanism by which the 
phenomenon came about.”9 Other scholars doubt that the human mind 
3. See Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L. J. 349 
(1992).
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27
(AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also id. § 36.
5. Courts and scholars have long recognized the problem of overdetermined harm—harm pro-
duced by multiple sufficient causes—and the inadequacy of the but-for standard for these situations. See
Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA L. REV. 941, 947 (1935); Robert J. Peaslee, 
Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1934).
6. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW art. 3:102 (2005) (“In case of multiple activities, 
where each of them alone would have caused the damage at the same time, each activity is regarded as 
a cause of the victim’s damage.”); id. art. 3:105 (“In the case of multiple activities, when it is certain 
that none of them has caused the entire damage or any determinable part thereof, those that are likely to 
have [minimally] contributed to the damage are presumed to have caused equal shares thereof.”). 
7. The NESS test considers that a factual cause is a “Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set.” See
Wright, supra note 1, at 1788; Chris Miller, NESS for Beginners, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 323 
(Richard Goldberg ed., 2011).
8. Jane Stapleton, Unnecessary Causes, 129 LAW Q. REV. 39, 39 (2013). 
9. Id. (“This article argues that a preferable approach for private law is a clear recognition of a 
general principle that all that is required before the relation between a factor and the existence of a 
phenomenon will be recognised as ‘causal’ is that: either, but for the factor, the phenomenon would 
have been prevented; or the factor resulted in some positive contribution to the relevant mechanism by 
which the phenomenon came about. In other words, that, when determining what it means to be a 
‘cause,’ private law should adopt a notion of a ‘cause’ that is wider than the relation of necessity that is 
encapsulated in the but-for test.”); see PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW art. 3:105 (2005). Article 
3:105 uses the term of “partial causation” and adds “those that are likely to have [minimally] contribut-
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could ever capture all the difficulties encapsulated in causation require-
ments.10 The aim of this article is to add to this literature on overdeter-
mined causation cases and show that economic models could be very useful 
to legal scholars.
The causation issue has a long and complicated story in law and eco-
nomics. Indeed, the seminal paper published by Ronald H. Coase in 1960 
relied on the idea that harm was symmetric and, therefore, causation was 
misleading.11 Coase’s idea was that if tort laws aim at maximizing the so-
cial welfare—assuming evaluation of social welfare is possible—causation 
issues are irrelevant. The only thing to do is to compare the different activi-
ties (injuring and injured activities) from the point of view of efficiency. 
And the main social role played by tort law is to allocate the respective 
rights.12 Many law and economics models, including those about multiple 
tortfeasors, agree with Coase and focus on efficiency, incentives, deter-
rence and maximization of welfare.13
Our approach is different from these models that are based on incen-
tives and deterrence.14 We use another branch of economic theory, named 
ed to the damage.” See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS NEGLIGENT CONDUCT AS NECESSARY 
ANTECEDENT OF HARM § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
10. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 317 (“While I applaud the use of devices such as the but-for test 
and the NESS test to clarify our thinking about cause, I cannot believe we will ever be able to develop a 
mechanical test that will satisfactorily resolve difficult issues such as those discussed in this article.”); 
see Peaslee, supra note 5, at 1131 (“Logic does not always have the last word in the law.”). For similar 
ideas in France, see Boris Starck, La pluralité des causes de dommages et responsabilité civile, JCP 
1970, I, 2339, 13: “Dans ce domaine, il n’existe aucun critère concevable pour apprécier l’influence 
causale de divers facteurs ayant contribué à provoquer le dommage.” (“On this issue there is no con-
ceivable criteria to evaluate the causal influence of several factors that brought about harm.”).
11. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Robert D. Cooter asks:
“[h]ow is legal cause imbedded in formal models? Do the formal models clarify difficult legal issues 
about causation, as concluded by such writers as Calabresi, Shavell, and Landes and Posner? Is the 
disappearance of ‘cause’ from the formal models evidence of scientific progress and a reason for cele-
bration, as Russell’s views suggest? Or do the formal models obscure legal cause and suppress interest-
ing legal issues, as asserted by critics such as Wright?” Robert D. Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty 
and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 523, 523–24 (1987). For Posner and 
Landes, “[m]uch of the scholarly literature on the subject, including that part of the literature which 
takes an explicitly philosophical approach to questions of causation, is devoted to trying to define 
‘cause’ and then to fit the cases to the definition. The principal result of these efforts has been a nega-
tive one: to show that the notions of causation used in tort cases cannot be reduced to a single concept, 
whether necessary conditions, or sufficient conditions, or necessary and sufficient conditions.” Landes 
& Posner, supra note 1, at 109 (footnote omitted).
12. Coase, supra note 11, at 15.
13. One of the rare papers dealing with Coase, causation and cooperative game theory is Varouj 
A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J. L. ECON. 175, 175 
(1981).
14. In economics, constant attention has been devoted to this topic. See John Borgo, Causal 
Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 424 (1979); Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 111; 
Mario J. Rizzo & Franck S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment: Reply to the Critics, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
219, 219 (1986); Lewis Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfea-
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cooperative game theory, which deals with the properties of the rules to 
share a benefit or a cost resulting from a common activity between individ-
uals. Cooperative game theory seems particularly appropriate to deal with 
causation issues in the law because the concepts of subsets of players and 
contributions are the cornerstone of this approach and are relevant as ap-
plied to causation issues.
This idea has already been developed in philosophy by Martin van 
Hees and Matthew Braham to characterize “degrees of causation”.15 We 
follow these authors but we provide a more operational view for the law. 
We will see that applying cooperative game theory concepts highlights 
some of the paradoxes associated with overdetermined causation cases.
The language of game theory—coalition, sets, minimally sufficiency 
sets, contribution—is relevant to the law. This article also intends to pro-
vide a unified approach on overdetermined causation cases: first, the same 
model is used to cover most of the overdetermined causation cases; second, 
the deep relationships between different criteria of causation are made 
clearer by the language of game theory16; and third, causation criteria and 
sharing rules used to divide the damage among tortfeasors involved are 
analyzed in a unique framework.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section two pro-
vides examples of overdetermined causation cases to provide a typology of 
the different situations covered. Section three defines “overdetermined 
causation games.” The concepts of players (individuals), coalitions of play-
ers, and characteristic functions are introduced in the circumstances of 
multiple causation. It then studies the general properties of these games. 
Section four develops the concept of a player’s contribution to a coalition, 
including the grand coalition which joins all the tortfeasors. This section 
demonstrates that saying “a player has not been a necessary cause”—that is 
to say that the harm would have occurred even if he had not acted tortious-
sors, 98 YALE L.J. 831, 831 (1989); Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, The Efficiency of Comparative 
Causation, 6 REV. L. ECON. 219 (2010); Robert Young et al., Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic 
Analysis, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 111 (2007).
15. See Martin van Hees & Matthew Braham, Degrees of Causation, 71 ERKENN 323 (2009). We 
have already shown that such an approach could be fruitful to handle multiple causation. See Pierre 
Dehez & Samuel Ferey, How to Share Joint Liability: A Cooperative Game Approach, 66 
MATHEMATICAL SOC. SCI. 44 (2013); Samuel Ferey & Pierre Dehez, Multiple Causation, Apportion-
ment and the Shapley Value, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2016). 
16. See Robert J. Aumann, What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish, in FRONTIERS OF 
ECONOMICS 7 (K. Arrow & S. Honkapohja eds., 1985) (“This brings us to the second component of 
comprehension, which is really part of the first: unification. The broader the area that is covered by a 
theory, the greater is its ‘validity’. I am not thinking of ‘validity’ in the usual sense of truth, but rather in 
the sense of applicability or usefulness[.]”).
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ly—is not equivalent to saying that “his contribution is zero.”17 In other 
words, there is room to consider both that a tortfeasor (i) has positively 
contributed to the damage and (ii) has not been a necessary condition. Sec-
tion four insists on the Shapley value as a relevant evaluation of the contri-
bution of a player to the game. The Shapley value is consistent with the 
NESS criteria. However, as this article insists on an evaluation of the indi-
vidual contribution to the final damage, those interested in partial causation 
based on contribution may be convinced. Lastly, this evaluation could be a 
benchmark to apportion damage between tortfeasors in the case of several 
and joint liability when one tortfeasor has completely paid the victim and 
has a claim against the other tortfeasors to get its shares back. Section five 
concludes. The findings of the article leave room for considering other 
sharing rules and comparing their results and properties with the Shapley 
value.
II. OVERDETERMINED CAUSATION CASES: EXAMPLES AND 
PARADOXES
Overdetermination is a general category under which several kinds of 
cases may be subsumed. In the legal literature and sources, other terms 
referring to more or less the same issue are used: “multiple sufficient caus-
es,” “preemption” or “preemptive causes,” “additional causes,”18 “compet-
ing causes,”19 “concurrent causes,”20 “duplicative-causation,”21
“insufficient causes,”22 “unnecessary causes,” “threshold cases,”23 or “cu-
mulative sources of harm.”24 These categories may refer to different hy-
17. This is all the more interesting because our approach builds a bridge between the but-for test, 
the NESS test and contribution. See the criticism from the Restatement (Third) against the Restatement 
(Second) about the “substantial factor” test which assumes an evaluation of the causal strength of the 
tortious act. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 36
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
18. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 1, at 235 (“[W]e deal with additional causes, i.e. with cases in 
which there are present on a given occasion two or more factors each sufficient with other normal 
conditions to bring about certain harm.”). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
19. Id. “This Section applies whenever there are two or more competing causes, each of which is 
sufficient without the other to cause the harm and each of which is in operation at the time the plain-
tiff’s harm occurs.” Id. 
20. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW art. 3:102 (2005).
21. Wright, supra note 1, at 1791.
22. Fischer, supra note 2, at 277.
23. Stapleton, supra note 9, at 39.
24. Miller, supra note 7, at 327.
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potheses, scenarios, and cases,25 but they share a common property: that 
one or several tortfeasors will not be considered a cause under the but-for-
test because their tortious act is not necessary (i.e., even if they had acted 
non-tortiously, the harm would have still occurred). This section gives 
some examples and cases and explores the paradoxes raised. In all the fol-
lowing, we use the traditional legal definition of the but-for-test.
A. Multiple Sufficient and Unnecessary Causes (Rosaria and Vincenzo 
Fires)
The first example is the simplest. It deals with multiple sufficient 
causes and is well illustrated by the two-fire case.26 In that case, two fires 
negligently and independently lit by two people merge and destroy the 
property of the victim. Neither of the two tortious acts are a necessary con-
dition for the harm in the sense that if one of the tortfeasors had not lit his 
fire, the harm would have still happened. In other words, neither of the two 
fires was necessary but both were sufficient. The strict application of the 
but-for test would exonerate both of them—a result that is uncomfortable. 
Here is an example of duplicative causation and is the first category of 
overdetermined causation cases.
B. Multiple Sufficient Causal Sets: Unnecessary and Non-sufficient 
Conditions (Paul’s Car)
The second case, “Paul’s car,” following the illustration provided by 
the Restatement,27 changes the previous example by assuming that tortious 
activities are neither necessary nor sufficient:
Able, Baker and Charlie, acting independently but simultaneously, each 
negligently lean on Paul’s car, which is parked at the lookout at the top 
25. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 1, at 1791–1801 (discussing the Hart and Honoré typology). 
“Perhaps as a result of their confusing typology, Hart and Honoré lose sight of the basic concept of 
causation embodied in the NESS test.” Id. at 1797. 
26. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 280. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Rosaria and Vincenzo were 
independently camping in a heavily forested campground. Each one had a campfire, and each negligent-
ly failed to ensure that the fire was extinguished upon retiring for the night. Due to unusually dry forest 
conditions and a stiff wind, both campfires escaped their sites and began a forest fire. The two fires, 
burning out of control, joined together and engulfed Centurion Company’s hunting lodge, destroying it. 
Either fire alone would have destroyed the lodge. Each of Rosaria’s and Vincenzo’s negligence is a 
factual cause of the destruction of Centurion’s hunting lodge.”).
27. See Carpenter, supra note 5, at 948. Stapleton illustrates this by the bridge example. Stapleton, 
supra note 9, at 43 (“No individual was necessary for the destruction of the car, yet, it seems plausible 
that the law would want to identify their role. If the law required a factor to satisfy the but for test 
before it would be recognized as a factual ‘cause’ the striking result would be that the law would not 
identify any of these three individuals as a ‘cause’ of the car’s destruction.”).
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of a mountain. Their combined force results in the car rolling over a di-
minutive curbstone and plummeting down the mountain to its destruc-
tion. The force exerted by the push of any one actor would have been 
insufficient to propel Paul’s car past the curbstone, but the combined 
force of any two of them is sufficient.28
Here too, the but-for test seems to be inappropriate and leads to exon-
eration of the three tortfeasors because none are necessary. But, dealing 
with those cases is different from the two fires example; contrary to that 
case, neither of the tortious acts is sufficient. There are only sets of tortious 
conduct that are sufficient to actually cause the harm. The Restatement
clearly recognizes this feature and refers to “multiple sufficient causal 
sets.” These cases have motivated legal scholars to find another criteria of 
causation. The NESS test advocates that A is a factual cause of the harm 
because it is possible to find a set of torfeasors including A which is suffi-
cient to cause the harm and where A is a necessary element of this set. The 
set {A,B} is sufficient to destroy the car and kill the passenger and, at the 
same time, removing A from the set {A,B} leads to no harm. A is a neces-
sary element of a sufficient set.29
C. Unnecessary Causes: One is Sufficient, the Others Are Not 
(Bridge)
The two previous cases do not cover all the overdetermined causation 
cases. More subtle and complex cases, which are not properly handled by 
the dichotomy “unnecessary and sufficiency” or “unnecessary and no suffi-
ciency,” are easy to imagine. The “threshold cases” described by Stapleton 
are cases of this type.
Assume a bridge carrying a train line was built to withstand a weight 
below sixteen units. The train weighs ten units and the three tortfeasors 
place different weights on the bridge (A: six units; B: three units and C:
three units). The train passes across the bridge, the bridge collapses and a 
passenger is killed. Now, A is unnecessary but sufficient, while B and C are 
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27
cmt. f, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Stapleton, supra note 9, at 47–48 (“On a certain train line the 
trains weigh 10 units each; a bridge carrying the line was built to withstand a weight of 20 units. A train 
will pass across the bridge at noon. Before noon X deposits a weight of 6 units within the bridge struc-
ture, then Y deposits another 6-unit weight, then Z deposits another 6-unit weight. X, Y and Z act 
independently and are unaware of the conduct of each other. At noon the train attempts to cross the 
bridge which collapses, killing a passenger on the train.”).
29. Miller states an important point about the NESS test: “Central to Wright’s approach (and 
contrary to that of many legal scholars in this area) is the assertion that it is possible to construct a 
causal account of a set of events (leading to a harmful outcome) which is independent of those consid-
erations by which an agent of these events might be deemed legally liable.” Miller, supra note 7, at 323.
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unnecessary and not sufficient. The but-for test would reach a solution 
where no tortfeasor would be liable. At the same time, the NESS test would 
say that the three tortious conducts are factual causes of harm (there exists 
at least one set where A, B and C are necessary for the sufficiency of the 
set).30
But the NESS test gives little information about the respective degrees 
of causation and the causal contributions of each of the tortious acts. Agent 
A could be said to have had a more important causal power or contribution 
than B or C.31 Activity A is sufficient while the other ones are not, so is it 
meaningful to consider that A has had a more important causal power than 
B or C? It appears that Hart and Honoré address this issue when they refer 
to “degrees of causation.”32 In other words, this example raises the issue of 
whether apportionment among tortfeasors should be done on the basis of 
their causal contributions to the harm. Our model will deal with this issue 
in section three.
D. Non-sufficient Causes: One is Necessary and 
the Other is Not (Pollution)
The typology in terms of necessary and sufficient causes leads to other 
possible cases mixing a necessary cause with an unnecessary one, both 
being non-sufficient. An example is the case where multiple firms have 
caused damage by simultaneously pouring amounts of a toxic substance 
into a lake and where no single firm could cause the damage alone. Imag-
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Moreover, the fact that the other person’s conduct is sufficient to cause 
the harm does not prevent the actor’s conduct from being a factual cause of harm pursuant to this 
Section, if the actor’s conduct is necessary to at least one causal set. Sometimes, one actor’s contribu-
tion may be sufficient to bring about the harm while another actor’s contribution is only sufficient when 
combined with some portion of the first actor’s contribution. Whether the second actor’s contribution 
can be so combined into a sufficient causal set is a matter on which this Restatement takes no position 
and leaves to future development in the courts.”).
31. This point is recognized in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL 
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2010)
32. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 1, at 233 (“Can a meaning be attached to ‘degrees of causa-
tion’? There are some indications in ordinary speech that it can. An event is often, outside the law, said 
to be caused partly by one factor and partly by another, or more by one thing than another, or mostly by 
a particular factor. If then, ‘degrees of responsibility’ are to be interpreted in causal terms the most 
rational basis for apportionment becomes the relatively dangerous character of the acts of the various 
tortfeasors.”); see also van Hees & Braham, supra note 15, at 325: (“The meaning attached to “substan-
tial factor” is close. Given the practical demand, can any factual content be given to the notion of 
degrees of causation? One prominent answer, which is the one that Hart and Honoré (1959, p. 233ff) 
provided in their seminal monograph Causation in the Law is to say that the concept, while valid, is 
inescapably vague with its substance being provided by attributive terms of ordinary language. That is, 
‘degrees of causation’ is captured by locutions such as the ‘chief’ or ‘main’ or ‘principal’ cause, or of 
‘more important’, ‘effective’ or ‘potent’ causes.”). 
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ine now that the victim raises salmon in a pond on his property.33 Three 
firms, identified as 1, 2 and 3, negligently poison this pond by pouring 
dangerous chemicals. Assume a threshold exists, say seventy-five units, 
above which the concentration of chemicals becomes lethal for salmon. 
Assume that firm 1 has poured fifty units while firms 2 and 3 have poured 
thirty units each.34 Firm 1’s tortious act is necessary but not sufficient 
while firm 2’s tortious act is neither unnecessary nor sufficient. And the 
same applies to firm 3.
Applying the but-for test, courts would declare firm 1 liable and exon-
erate firms 2 and 3, despite the fact that firm 1 alone would not have ex-
ceeded the threshold.35 Illustration 4 in the Restatement belongs to this 
category when it states “that there are common elements in each of the 
sufficient causal sets does not prevent each of the sets from being a factual 
cause pursuant to this Section.”36 At the same time, compared to the previ-
ous example, common sense would say that firm 1 is “more causally” in-
volved than the other two firms.
E. Non-sufficient Necessary Causes and Sufficient Unnecessary Cause 
(Push/Pull Car)
The last type of example is less likely to happen and implies what Hart 
and Honoré call “neutralizing causes.”37 Such cases shall not exist with two 
players because it is impossible and contradictory for A to be necessary and 
non-sufficient and for B to be unnecessary and sufficient at the same time. 
However, with three tortfeasors (A, B and C), such a structure may appear. 
It would be the case in the Paul’s car example if A is not strong enough to 
move the car by himself while B and C are strong enough. Imagine that A
33. See Wright, supra note 1.
34. The same structure would be obtained by changing the Paul car’s example and assuming that 
one of the three tortfeasors would be stronger than the others but not strong enough to push the car by 
himself. If he needs the help of only one of the two others, this tortfeasor is a wrongdoer who belongs to 
all the sufficient sets that bring about the harm.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27
cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“When a person contracts a disease such as cancer, and sues multiple 
actors claiming that each provided some dose of a toxic substance that caused the disease, the question 
of the causal role of each defendant’s toxic substance arises. Assuming that there is some threshold dose 
sufficient to cause the disease, the person may have been exposed to doses in excess of the threshold 
before contracting the disease. Thus, some or all of the person’s exposures may not have been but-for 
causes of the disease. Nevertheless, each of the exposures prior to the person’s contracting the disease 
(or the time at which the disease was determined, see § 26, Comment k) is a factual cause of the per-
son’s disease under the rule in this Section.”).
36. Id. at cmt. f. 
37. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 1, at 239 (giving the example that “[a] negligently sets a fire 
which would have been sufficient to destroy C’s house but, before the fire reaches C’s house, it is 
quenched by the waters which B has negligently allowed to escape from a dam. . . .”).
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and B have pushed the car while C has pulled it. Suppose that a force of 
10—in any direction—is enough to move the car and destroy it and that A
exerts an external force on the car up to 5, B up to 20 and C exerts an oppo-
site force up to 15. In that situation, B alone (or C alone) would have de-
stroyed the car, (so B or C is sufficient but not necessary) but B and C taken 
together do not bring about any harm (because one pulls the car while the 
other pushes it), so B and C are neutralizing causes. It is because A partici-
pates in the common activity and adds a small and marginal push that the 
car actually falls into the ravine (so A is not sufficient but necessary, as 
well).38
To conclude, Table 1 summarizes different situations implying neces-
sary and unnecessary causes, sufficient causes and non-sufficient causes. 
We restrain our table to two potential causes (A and B) for more simplicity. 
Several remarks should be made. First, the table is symmetric and all the 
combinations are not possible (for example two different causes cannot be 
“necessary and sufficient”). Second, some combinations are impossible 
with two players but become possible with three. This is illustrated by both 
the Paul’s car and push/pull cases. Third, the case implying two necessary 
and no sufficient causes is excluded because it is not an overdetermined 
causation case. In this way, the table covers all types of overdetermined 
causation cases.
Table 1. Overdetermined causation case: a typology
A
Necessary Not Necessary
Sufficient Not Sufficient Sufficient Not Sufficient
B
Necessary
Sufficient Impossible Impossible Impossible Trivial
Not 
Sufficient
Impossible Excluded Push/pull car Pollution
Not Sufficient Impossible Push/pull car Two fires Bridge
38. Under these assumptions, C (resp. B) is a sufficient and unnecessary cause. The same structure 
would take place in some case of preemptive causation where the consequences of an act are neutral-
ized by the consequences of another act. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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Necessary Not 
Sufficient
Trivial Pollution Bridge Paul’s car
III. OVERDETERMINED CAUSATION GAMES
This section elaborates on cooperative game theory developed in eco-
nomics to handle overdetermination issues in the law. Intuitively, we argue 
that people have acted together to bring about the harmful consequences. 
We do not mean that they jointly acted on purpose but only that their joint 
acts have had a consequence—the harm suffered by the victim denoted d (d
is the monetized damage to be paid by liable parties to the victim). The first 
step of the model is to formally “describe” the data of the case. The second 
step is to characterize the individual contribution of each player to the 
common result d. The third step is to analyze how to share the liability 
among the players.
We provide a model in order to capture the essential features of over-
determined causation cases. First, “liability games” are formally defined. 
The concepts of grand coalition and sub-coalitions in relation to the law are 
presented and discussed. Second, this section deals with the marginal con-
tribution concept in order to characterize necessity, sufficiency and the but-
for test in terms of individual contribution to a coalition. The main finding 
of this section is to demonstrate that cooperative game theory is relevant to 
better understand causation issues in the law, and it allows for better char-
acterizing what the law refers to as “sufficient,” “sufficient sets,” “multiple 
sufficient causes,” or “but-for test.”
A. Definitions of Overdetermined Causation Games: Coalition and 
Causation
We consider a case involving multiple tortfeasors. Contrary to many 
law and economics models considering causation from an ex ante perspec-
tive, we consider causation issues from an ex post perspective, once the 
harm has occurred. We assume that courts are able to monetize the harm 
suffered by the victim. The set of the tortfeasors involved in the case is 
denoted by N (n ? 2). Tortfeasors are called the players of the game; the 
three people negligently pushing Paul’s car are the set of players in exam-
ple 1, the three polluters negligently polluting the stream are the set of 
players in example 4, etc. We do not assume that they should be held to be 
a factual cause but only that they are involved in the case.
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To formalize this idea, let us assume that n injurers have been in-
volved, n ? 2. Each injurer is identified by an index i running from 1 to n.
We consider all possible subsets of the set N = {1,. . .n} of all injurers and 
we denote by v(S) the potential damage of subset S.39 The potential damag-
es v(S) are all hypothetical, except v(N), which is nothing but the actual 
damage suffered by the victim that must be divided between the injurers.
In this way, we construct a “characteristic function” v that associates a 
number to each subset of N. Formally, the couple (N,v) is a cooperative 
game with transferable utility.40 Here, injurers are “players,” subsets of 
injurers are “coalitions” and potential damages are coalitions’ worth. The 
toolbox of the theory of cooperative games can then be used. Here, we shall 
use the Shapley value, a well-known allocation rule introduced by Lloyd 
Shapley in 1953, based on the notion of marginal contribution.41
In a general context, v(S) is the “worth” of coalition S which measures 
the minimum that coalition S can ensure by itself, if it forms. In our con-
text, v(N) has to be considered as an actual and observable event—the actu-
al result from the tortious acts of all the players involved. On the contrary, 
v(S) with S a proper subset of N, should be interpreted as a counterfactual 
situation, i.e., the harm that would have occurred if the players outside S
had not acted tortiously.42 In the Paul’s car example, v(AB) is the harm 
brought about by A and B pushing the car, assuming that C did not push the 
car;43 v(A) is the harm brought about by the behavior of A (A’s push) in the 
hypothetical circumstances where B and C have not pushed the car.44 In our 
example, A is not strong enough to move the car by himself; consequently, 
in that hypothetical situation, the harm would not have occurred and 
v(A) = 0.45
39. The empty set ? is a subset and, by convention, v(?) = 0. The empty set refers to the “normal 
course of events” assuming that no tortious act occurs by any players. The harm in that hypothetical 
state of the world is normalized to zero.
40. Transferable utility games introduced by JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN,
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (Princeton Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1953) (1944).
41. Contrary to van Hees and Braham, supra note 15, who insist on power index, we argue that 
the Shapley value needs to be considered to assess the causal contribution. 
42. Fischer criticizes the NESS test by using a splitting argument. Fischer, supra note 2.
43. The worth of a coalition {A,B} should be noted v({A,B}). For simplicity, we write 
v({A,B}) = v(AB).
44. For simplicity, our approach is dichotomous: we deal with two types of actions (“push” or 
“not push”) but it would be possible to introduce more subtle actions as “a weak push,” a “strong push,”
etc. Similarly, only two states of the world are considered here (damage occurs or not). What matters is 
the possibility to associate a value to every coalition. 
45. The important point is that the characteristic function does not make a specific hypothesis on 
causation between players and harm. Indeed, we could add a fourth player, D, named Smith, who, at the 
same time that Paul’s car was pushed in the ravine, drove too fast on a highway far away. D acted 
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With two tortfeasors, there are 3 coalitions: {1}, {2}, {1,2}. With 
three tortfeasors, there are 7 coalitions : {1}, {2}, {3}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}, 
{1,2,3}.46 The function v associates to each coalition the harm it brings 
about. In the following, we illustrate the formal concept with cases present-
ed in section two. See, for example, the “pollution game.” The set of tort-
feasors is N = {1,2,3} and the associated characteristic function v is given 
by:
(1) (2) (3) 0
(12) (13)
(23) 0
(123)
v v v
v v d
v
v d
? ? ?
? ?
?
?
By analogy with a voting process, it could be said that firm 1 has a ve-
to; without firm 1, damage would not occur.
B. Marginal Contributions and Causation Criteria
The originality of cooperative game theory lies in the concepts of coa-
lition and worth of a coalition. This is particularly relevant for multiple 
causation cases. Indeed, we are able to measure the change in the worth of 
a coalition when adding or removing a player from that coalition. This is 
captured by the notion of individual marginal contribution of a player to 
any coalition S. Formally, the marginal contribution of player i to coalition 
S is defined by:
( ) ( ) ( \ )iCm S v S v S i? ?
It is the difference between the worth of coalition S and the worth of 
coalition S without player i (a difference which is of course equal to zero 
when i is not included in S). We argue that it is accurate, relevant and fruit-
ful to describe some of the most common legal causation concepts used by 
scholars, such as the but-for test, NESS test or necessity/sufficiency di-
chotomy, in terms of marginal contributions.
Consider first necessity in the legal sense of the but-for test. A player i
is said to be necessary to a coalition S if and only if removing player i from 
S leads to decrease its worth from d to zero:
tortiously and could be added as a player of Paul’s car game but he will be a nul player because he 
never changes the value of any coalition regarding the car destruction. 
46. For n players, there are 2n–1 coalitions. The order of players has no importance, the coalitions 
{1,2} and {2,1} are the same. 
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( )iCm S d?
From this point of view, the necessity requirement of the but-for test 
proceeds by comparing the state of the world that occurred where i has 
tortiously acted with a hypothetical state of the world without i’s act, as-
suming the other tortfeasors have tortiously acted. In formal terms, a player 
will be said necessary according to the but-for test if and only if he is nec-
essary to the grand coalition N:
( )iCm N d?
It should be noticed that the but-for test does not take into account the 
marginal contributions to sub-coalitions. In the two fires example, none of 
the tortfeasors could be said necessary because their contribution to the 
grand coalition is zero. Remove player 1 (resp. player 2) from the subset 
{1,2}—i.e., compare the state of the world with player 1 (resp. 2) and the 
state of the world without player 1 (resp. 2):
A torfeasor is said to have been sufficient for the occurrence of the 
damage if and only if his individual marginal contribution is equal to the 
harm d:
( ) ( )iCm i v i d? ?
Such a definition can be extended to coalition. A coalition is sufficient 
if its worth is equal to d. A subset S of tortfeasors will be said “minimally 
sufficient” if and only if the marginal contributions of all the players in S
equal d. The players are consequently necessary to the sufficiency of this 
coalition. The concept of minimally sufficient is in line with the NESS test. 
In the bridge example, {1,2}, {1,3} and {2,3} are minimally sufficient 
subsets.
C. Characterizing Overdetermined Causation Cases
The concept of marginal contribution helps in characterizing overde-
termined causation cases. They are games (N,v) where the marginal contri-
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bution to the grand coalition is zero for at least one non nul player.47 Table 
2 lists the different cases in terms of marginal contributions.
Table 2. Overdetermined causation case: marginal contributions, neces-
sity and sufficiency
47. A player who never contributes is a nul player. His marginal contributions are all equal to 
zero.
A
Necessary
( )
A
Cm N d?
Not Necessary
( ) 0
A
Cm N ?
Not Sufficiency
(A) 0
A
Cm ?
Sufficient
(A)
A
Cm d?
Not Sufficient
(A) 0
A
Cm ?
B
Necessary
( )
B
Cm N d?
Not Sufficient
( ) 0
B
Cm B ?
Excluded Pull/Push car Pollution
Not Necessary
( ) 0
B
Cm N ?
Sufficient
( )
B
Cm N d? Pull/Push car Two fires Bridge
Not Sufficient
( ) 0
B
Cm B ?
Pollution Bridge Paul’s car
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The failure of the but-for test is better understood. Mathematically, 
nothing prevents marginal contribution to the grand coalition from being 
zero for all the players. This is not the same thing as considering that global
contribution is zero. The main criticism this article attributes to the but-for 
test is that it is too restrictive; it considers only the contributions to the 
grand coalition. However, the effective contribution of a player to the final 
result lies not only on his contribution to the grand coalition but also on his 
contributions to the intermediate coalitions. In the Paul’s car example, the 
marginal contribution of player 1 to the grand coalition is zero precisely 
because coalition {2,3} already has a positive worth. In other words, it is 
because players 2 and 3 have already together caused the harm that player 1 
provides no additional harm to this coalition. Obviously, what could be said 
about player 1 is also true for players 2 and 3. An appropriate causation 
criterion should take account of this property. Regarding this issue, the 
NESS test is superior because it takes into account all the sufficiency sets 
(including intermediate coalitions). This leaves room for evaluating the 
“degree of causation” or the causal influence of an activity on the occur-
rence of the harm, and the Shapley value appears to be an interesting and 
useful benchmark for this evaluation.
IV. CAUSATION, CONTRIBUTION AND THE SHAPLEY VALUE
We have shown that the classical concepts of the cooperative game 
theory are relevant to analyze the law. The next step is to deal with the best 
apportionment of liability among tortfeasors.
A. Sharing Rules and Apportionment
The multiple causation cases lead to a practical difficulty: how to 
share the damage to be paid to the victim among the tortfeasors involved. 
In most of the cases, the victims have a right to be fully compensated for 
their loss and the shares of each torfeasor need to be determined. This is the 
case of joint and several liability.48 The Third Restatement advocates a two-
step process: first, apportionment by causation and second, apportionment 
by responsibility.49 However, some argue that operationalizing that two-
48. In most cases involving multiple tortfeasors, plaintiffs can sue the defendants jointly or sepa-
rately and the law allows for contribution among joint tortfeasors. See Michael Faure, Attribution of 
Liability: An Economic Analysis of Various Cases, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 101, 104–07 (2016). 
49. For an analysis of the two step process in terms of the Shapley value applied to successive 
injuries (“sequential liability games”), see Dehez & Ferey, supra note 15.
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step process in overdetermined causation cases is quite complicated. For 
Michael D. Green, asbestos litigation illustrates the difficulty:
Assessing causal roles in asbestos gets into some of the knottiest causal 
problems in tort law: Consider two of the most interesting, yet perplex-
ing: First, suppose that for a plaintiff to contract lung cancer, a threshold 
dose, say 100 units of asbestos exposure is required. Suppose that de-
fendant has been exposed to 105 units of asbestos by 21 defendants, each 
providing 5 units of exposure. Each one can claim that it was not a but 
for cause of the harm because absent its asbestos, the plaintiff still would 
have contracted lung cancer. This is the toxic substances analog of the 
classic problem of two independently set fires, each of which would have 
burned down the plaintiff’s house at the same time. Courts have, uni-
formly in the case of two tortfeasors who set the fires, held them both li-
able, employing the ‘substantial factor’ rubric of the Second 
Restatement.50
The example is the same as Paul’s car of our typology and has the 
same structure as the pollution case where each polluter pours fifty units of 
toxic substances in a lake with a threshold of 100 units. No apportionment 
on causal basis seems to be implemented, at least when the but-for test is 
used. This is the consequence of the but-for test’s restrictiveness: the but-
for test takes into account only the marginal contribution to the grand coali-
tion. Another approach is possible: assessing the causal contribution taking 
into account the marginal contributions to all coalitions. This is precisely 
what the Shapley value does. In the remainder of the section, we explain 
why the Shapley value can be used to evaluate the causal contribution of 
each of the tortfeasors.
B. The Shapley Value: Formula and Applications
An injury has been caused by several actors (injurers or tortfeasors). 
The problem is to specify a division of the resulting damages among the 
injurers. Our idea is to base the division on “marginal damages.” The Shap-
ley value allocates v(N), the worth of the “grand coalition” N (which is also 
the value of the damage to be paid and shared among tortfeasors), on the 
basis of players’ contributions to all coalitions, not only on the basis of 
their contributions to N.
50. Michael D. Green, Second Thoughts About Apportionment in Asbestos Litigation, 37 SW. U. L.
REV. 531, 535 (2008). For a similar view, see Miller, supra note 7, at 337; see Green (“Does it matter 
if, instead of 21 defendants, there are two—one who provides 100 units, sufficient by itself to cause the 
disease, while the second defendant provides five units? The second problem occurs when other de-
fendants provide 105 units and the 22nd defendant contributes but one-tenth or even one-hundredth of a 
dose, a trivial dose. This gets to the frequency, regularity, and proximity requirement that many states 
have imposed, which sets a threshold of involvement before a defendant can be found a cause at all.”).
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The Shapley value is defined as a weighted average of players’ mar-
ginal contributions:
? ?( )! ( 1)!
!
( , ) ( ) ( \ )i
S N
n s s
n
SV N v v S v S i
?
? ?? ?? i = 1,. . .,n (*)
where the weights depend on coalition size.51
The Shapley value provides an evaluation of the contribution of each 
player to the final result while taking account of their individual marginal 
contributions to all the coalitions. As such, it is a formula. However, it is 
based on desirable properties that an allocation rule should possess.52 Let
us consider a simple case (Paul’s car) involving three players:
v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0
v(1,2) = v(1,3) =v(2,3) = d
v(1,2,3)=d
This is a symmetric game; all players are equal and the Shapley value 
allocates an identical amount to each player. This is confirmed by the fol-
lowing table:53
Applying formula (*), the Shapley value indeed reduces to the equal 
division allocation: SV1 = SV2 =SV3 = d/3. The three players would be ex-
onerated if the but-for test were applied; their marginal contribution to the 
grand coalition is indeed zero. The Shapley value provides an alternative 
apportionment and assesses that all have contributed one third to the vic-
tim’s loss. Each player is present in two subsets that cause the loss. They 
51. We use lowercase letters to indicate subsets’ sizes: n = |N|, s = |S| . . . .
52. See Dehez & Ferey, supra note 15, for details on axiomatizations of the Shapley value.
53. Only the coalitions with non-zero worth are listed. 
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 weight
S= {2,3} d 0 d 1/6
S= {1,2} d 0 d 1/6
S = {1,3} d 0 d 1/6
S = {1,2,3} 0 0 0 1/3
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are in a symmetric situation and the result is quite natural. It could be said 
that the Shapley value is consistent with the NESS test insofar as the 2-
player sets {1,2}, {2,3} and {1,3} are sufficient and each of the players are 
necessary elements of these sufficient sets.
Let’s consider another example: the pollution game. The resulting po-
tential damages are given by:
v(1) = v(2) = v(2,3) = 0
v(1,2) = v(1,3) = v(1,2,3) = d
Here, the marginal contributions are different from the previous case 
because 1 is a necessary (but not sufficient) element. The following table 
gives the associated marginal damages.
Applying formula (*), the Shapley value reduces to the following allo-
cation of damages d:
SV1 = 2/3d
SV2 = SV3 = 1/6d
Injurer 1 supports 2/3 of damages d and the remaining third is allocat-
ed equally between injurers 2 and 3. They are indeed “equal.”54 The Shap-
ley value recognizes the role played by injurers 2 and 3. They have 
contributed to the harm insofar as they are necessary elements of a suffi-
cient set to bring the harm about. The Shapley value is an interesting shar-
54. If instead only the marginal contributions to the grand coalition, ( ) ( \ ),v N v N i? were 
taken into account (the but-for test), we would end up with a division of damages that imposes that 
injurer 1 pay for the entire damage, a division that could hardly be considered fair.
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 weight
S = {2,3} 0 0 0 1/6
S = {1,2} d d 0 1/6
S = {1,3} d 0 d 1/6
S = {1,2,3} d 0 0 1/3
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ing rule that takes into account the facts that, first: player 1 is a necessary 
element (1 is present in the three sets of tortfeasors which bring about the 
harm), but second: player 1 is not a sufficient element (it is necessary that 
either 2 or 3 joins 1 to cause the harm). That is why player 1 has not fully 
compensated the victim on his own (1 is not a necessary and sufficient 
cause); 2 and 3 have to pay a share of the damage. The Shapley value is 
one of the sharing rules developed in cooperative game theory that seems 
consistent with the NESS test insofar as the Shapley value takes account of 
the marginal contribution of players on all the intermediate—and suffi-
cient—sets (sub-coalitions) bringing about the harm.
C. Why the Shapley Value?
Another view of the Shapley value focuses on its properties. In coop-
erative game theory, these properties are called axioms. One of the most 
famous axiomatizations is attributed to Shapley55 and states that the Shap-
ley value follows four axioms: the first one is called efficiency; the second 
one is a nul player axiom; the third is a symmetric axiom; and the fourth is 
an additivity axiom. More precisely, it has been proved that the Shapley 
value is the only allocation rule that verifies these four axioms.
It is interesting enough to wonder whether these axioms (and their 
mathematical counterparts) have a meaning for the law. The first three 
axioms are quite obvious for the law. The first one states that the worth of 
the grand coalition is shared among players. This property implies that the 
entire damage, no more, no less, is paid to the victim by the tortfeasors. 
The second one is that a nul player (his contributions are zero for all coali-
tions) will not pay anything because he is not causal. The third one deals 
with equal treatment of equals regarding their participation in the harm 
(two symmetric players pay the same amount). The fourth axiom states that 
if a game G1 is the sum of two games G2 and G3 (G1=G2+G3), then the 
Shapley value calculated for each player and associated with G1 is the sum 
of the Shapley values associated with G2 and G3.
This last axiom is more difficult to interpret than the others, but this 
article insists on its meaning in the legal context. Indeed, according to us, 
the additivity axiom is in line with the principles advocated in the Restate-
ment regarding apportionment of damage among tortfeasors.56 The Re-
55. Lloyd S. Shapley, A Value for n-person Games, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF 
GAMES II 307–17 (Harold W. Kuhn & Albert William Tucker eds., 1953). There are several axiomati-
zation of the Shapley value, starting with Shapley’s original one.
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
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statement explicitly insists on the fact that when harms are divisible—i.e., 
it is possible to divide the harm in several parts57—these parts should be 
considered separately in terms of apportionment. Regarding this issue, it 
could be thought that the best sharing rule be additive i.e., the same appor-
tionment should be implemented by applying the sharing rule to the entire 
case or by applying the sharing rule separately to the different parts of the 
harm. It is precisely this result that the Shapley value leads to. The additivi-
ty property assures that the Shapley value leads to the same result. Let us 
imagine that three tortfeasors (A, B and C) pollute a lake by pouring toxic 
substances. Imagine that they destroy two fish farms, outcomes that cause 
two separate harms H1 and H2. But let us assume that the factfinder as-
sesses that A and B would have been sufficient to cause H1 and B and C 
would have been sufficient to cause H2. Moreover, he demonstrates that A 
is far enough from the second fish farm and consequently has not caused 
any damage to farm 1 and C is far enough from the first fish farm and con-
sequently has not caused any damage to farm 2.
What is the proper way to apportion damages in that case? Dividing 
harms by causation leads to dealing with H1 and H2 separately. The two 
“subcases” are overdetermined cases but A and B are involved in H1 and B 
and C are involved in H2. Applying an additive sharing rule makes sure 
that the amount of the compensation to be paid by A, B and C is the same 
whether the case is globally settled (H1 and H2 together) or the two cases 
are settled separately. This is a strong argument in favor of the Shapley 
value as a rule to apportion damages in the case of overdetermined cases.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Causation is one of the most intricate and difficult issues in the law. In 
the present article, we provide an economic approach to multiple causation 
in the law focused on a specific set of cases, the overdetermined causation 
cases. This article holds three main ideas. First, the language and concepts 
of cooperative game theory—sets, coalition, contribution, solution con-
cepts, sharing rules—are of great interest for legal scholars. They provide a 
formal approach to most of the legal concepts used in the literature such as 
“sufficiency set,” the NESS test, contribution, and the but-for test. Second, 
this approach highlights the paradoxes raised by a strict application of the 
but-for test. These paradoxes rely on the fact that the but-for test focuses on 
the marginal contributions to the great coalition but does not take into ac-
count the causal contributions to intermediate coalitions. We have shown 
57. Usually, a part of the harm is due only to one tortfeasor or to a subset of tortfeasors.
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that a zero contribution to the grand coalition does not mean that a player 
has not causally contributed (the share of a tortfeasor determined by the 
Shapley value may be positive even if his contribution to the grand coali-
tion is zero). There is a bridge between scholars advocating the use of the 
NESS test and the ones advocating contributive or substantial factor crite-
ria. Third, our approach leaves room open for considering other sharing 
rules in order to solve the difficulty in apportioning damage in the case of 
multiple causation.
